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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. Summani Dismissal Without 20 Days Notice of the Reasons Therefore as
Reauired bv LC. 6 19-4906(b) was Erroneous Given the Varmeness of the State's
... . , . .

.......
.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
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Both the State and Mr. Kelly agree that a petition for post-conviction relief may only be
summarily dismissed without further notice by the Court upon the motion of the State if the
State's motion sets forth adequate notice of the reasons for dismissal and the Court dismisses
upon those cited grounds. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 5-10, Respondent's Brief at pages
5-6. LC. 3 19-4906(c), Saylchamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,322,900 P.2d 795,798 (1995).
The State does not cite the case law that explains how this notice is to be structured.
Respondent's Brief at pages 5-6. However, as discussed in Mr. Kelly's Opening Brief, the case
law clearly requires that the State must set out the grounds for dismissal with particularity.
Saykhamchone v. State, supra. An example of a sufficiently particular notice is discussed in
Worlnnan v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798,804 (2007). "The State's answer and

motion also contained twenty-two pages of argument categorically addressing Workman's
allegations, identified by number. At the end of each set of thematically grouped, specifically
identified allegations, the motion states that the Court should 'DISMISS' the allegations, or that
the allegations should 'BE DISMISSED."' Id. See also, Franckc-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664,
669, 152 P.3d 25, 30 (Ct. App. 2006) (requiring identification of the particular basis for
dismissal). A notice should "provide sufficiently particular information regarding the basis for
[dismissal] as to enable the applicant to suppleinent the application with the necessary additional
facts, if they exist," and "also specify any legal analysis that the application would need to
address in order to avoid dismissal . . . " Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, 494, 163 P.3d 1201,

.
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1206 (Ct. App. 2006). "Proper notice must refer to specific allegations in the petition on a claimby-claim basis, and specifically refer to deficiencies in the evidence or additional legal analysis
void summary dismissal . . ." Anderson v. State, -Idaho
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-, 2007 WL 3227294"7 (Ct. App. 2007), review granted (2008).
Franck-Tee1 provides an example of an inadequate notice:
COMES NOW, the Respondent in the above-entitled action . . . and moves this
Court for an order dismissing the above-entitled action by reason of the following:
1. That Petitioner alleges conclusory allegations and does not raise a genuine
issue of material fact or timely filed.
2. Petitioner fails to present facts adequate to indicate that [her] counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process so as to
produce an unjust result.
3. Petitioner fails to present facts adequate to indicate that [her] counsel's
conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms

4. That the Petitioner fails to present facts adequate to indicate prejudice as a
result of deficient coilduct of [her] counsel.
5. That the Petitioner fails to assert facts adequate to overcome the presumption
that [her] counsel's performance constituted adequate assistance and was made
with all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
6. Petitioner failed to allege facts adequate to overcome the indication that
strategic and tactical decision were objectively appropriate.

Franck-Tee1 v. State, 143 Idaho at 669, 152 P.3d at 30. This notice was found inadequate
because it did not refer to Franck-Teel's specific allegations and thus could not be construed as
addressing the perceived flaws in any particular item of evidence or legal analysis which needed
to be addressed to avoid summary dismissal. Id.
In this case, the notice provided by the State is like the notice found inadequate in

Franck-Teel. Mr. ICelly's petition and affidavit raised 29 issues' which he alleged provided
grounds for relief in five ways: 1) denial of effective assistance of counsel; 2) denial of due
enialofthe right to a fair trial; and
,

.~..

5) prosecutorial misconduct. CR 5-12. However, in its memorandum in support of motion for

summaly dismissal, the State did not reply, as required by the case law, to each of Mr. Kelly's
specific issues or allegations referencing them by number and addressing the perceived flaws in
any particular item of evidence or the legal analysis which would have to be addressed to avoid
summary dismissal. Fvanck-Teel, supra. Rather, the State made broad and vague arguments
which it divided into five topics: 1) issues dealing with testimony at the preliminary hearing,
witness tampering, and failure of counsel to impeach witness testimony; 2) issues dealing with
trial counsel not obtaining experts and failure to investigate; 3) issues relating to PSI; 4) issues
concerning knowing and intelligent guilty plea; 5) issues pertaining to failure to file notice of
appeal. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, Exhibit on Appeal.
An adequate response in this case would have set out each of Mr. Kelly's claims for
relief, for example, denial of effective assistance of counsel, and then with citation to each of the
issues that could have arguably supported each claim, explain why the issues do not establish the
claim and/or what legal analysis is lacking so as to support each claim. Id. The State's response
could very generously be construed to have attempted to address the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, even by the most generous standards, it could not be read to
have addressed in any meaningful way the claims of denial of due process, right against self-

'

These 29 "issues" would actually have been more properly labeled as grounds to
support his claims. For example, issue 1 is, "The witnesses were told to point the finger at the
petitioner." CR 12.

incrimination, right to a fair trial, and prosecutorial misconduct. And, in no event could it be said
that the State's memorandum referred to Mr. Kelly's specific allegations.
The State's notice does no
Workman, supra, Franck-Teel, supra, Crabtree, supra, and Anderson, supra. Therefore, the
District Court erred in dismissing the case without providing 20 days notice from the Court of the
grounds for dismissal. Saykhamchone, supra.
B. In the Alternative, Dismissal Was Improper Because Mr. Kelly's Claims Were
Dismissed on Grounds Other Than Those Set Out in Either the State's Motion for
Summary Judment or its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment.
As set out in Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798, and discussed in
Mr. Kelly's Opening Brief at pages10-13, when the State files a motion for summary disposition,
but the dismissal is made on grounds different from those asserted in the State's motion, the
Court is deemed to have dismissed the petition on its own initiative and must provide 20 days
notice. See also, Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1982). In this case, the
State's notice offered grounds different from those ultimately relied upon by the Court for
dismissal, and therefore, the Court erred in not giving its own 20 day notice.
The State argues in its Respondent's Brief at pages 7-8, that the petition was dismissed
both for the reasons offered by the State and for additional reasons offered by the Court and
therefore no 20 day notice was required. However, this argument should be rejected as it is
contrary to the record.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 11-13, despite the State's protestations to the
contrary, the reasons offered by the Court for dismissal are markedly different from those offered

. . .

by the State's memorandum. For example, the State's memorandum does not even mention Mr.
Kelly's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, yet the Court dismisses those claims for laclc of
admissible evidence and failure to demonstrate prejudice. Memorandum in Supportof Motion
,
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for Summary Dismissal, Exhibit on Appeal. The State's belief that the dismissal was based upon
the reasons offered by the State in its lnemorandum is contrary to the record and therefore its
argument that the Court was not required to give 20 days notice of its intent to dismiss fails.
C. The District Court Erred In Holding the Hearing on the Motion for Summary
Dismissal in Mr. Kelly's Absence.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 13-15, Mr. Kelly sent the Court a
motion for transportation requesting to be brought before the Court to participate in the hearing
on the motion for summary dismissal. Mr. Kelly, who was being held out of state, mailed his
motion seeking to be transported for the hearing. Unfortunately, the motion was not filed until
after the Court had held the hearing in his absence. And, contrary to the constitutional rights to
due process and access to the courts, the motion for summary dismissal was granted without
reopening the hearing once the Court filed the motion for transportation to allow Mr. Kelly to
appear in person.
In the Opening Brief, Mr. Kelly set out the constitutional rights to due process and access
to the courts. Idaho Const. Art. 1, 5 18, U.S. Const. Amends. 1 and 14. And, he cited case law
establishing that a fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Application of Downing, 103 Idaho 689,692,652
P.2d 193, 196 (1982). He also noted that it was impossible for him to rebut the argument that he
had no evidentiary basis to support his claims when he was not represented by counsel nor given

.. .

. .

the opportunity to be heard in person.
In response to this, the State has written one paragraph asserting that Mr. Kelly has failed
lish, a violation of his due process rights. Respondent's Brief atpage
14.
However, as set out in the Opening Brief, to hold a hearing, regardless of whether the
State elected to present argument and evidence at that hearing, without allowing Mr. Kelly to
attend and to not reopen the hearing upon receiving the request for attendance, the District Court
denied Mr. Kelly his due process right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. Id. The fact that the State did not choose to present argument or evidence at the hearing
is irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Kelly's rights were violated.
By excluding him from the process, the District Court violated Mr. Kelly's state and
federal constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts. Idaho Const. Art. 1, $ 18,
U.S. Const. Amends. 1 and 14, Application ofDowning,supra. Therefore, the order granting
summary judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
D. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claim Regarding the Failure to Prepare a Defense on the Mistaken
Conclusion that all Failures to Prepare a Defense are Remedied by a Guilty Plea.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 15-16, the District Court erred in summarily
dismissing the claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not obtaining a
fingerprint expert and in not investigating whether a voice on a tape held by the State was really
Mr. Kelly's voice. The State has responded to this argument by "adopt[ing] the district court's
opinion on appeal." Respondent's Brief p. 13.
In its opinion, the Court dismissed Mr. Kelly's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

.
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in failing to obtain a fingerprint expert or investigating the authenticity of a tape held by the State
stating only, "Because Kelly voluntarily pled guilty to two charges[,] Stucki was foreclosed from
n alibi. There is no evidence that Stucki
provided ineffective legal assistance based on these allegations." CR 78. This analysis is
erroneous, because, as set out in the Opening Brief at pages 15-16, a guilty plea does not remedy
ineffective assistance of counsel in not adequately preparing and investigating prior to advising
entry of the plea. Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,92, 136 P.3d 475,479 (Ct. App. 2006), citing
Grqjth v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94,96 (Ct. App. 1992), Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366,370 (1985), andstate v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53, 55,822 P.2d 572,574 (Ct.
App. 1991).
The District Court concluded that because Mr. Kelly pled guilty, Stucki was foreclosed
from presenting a defense of mistaken identity or alibi and thus, there was no evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate or prepare those defenses. This analysis
was erroneous, insofar as a guilty plea does not automatically remedy all failures to investigate
and prepare. Id. Therefore, summary dismissal of this claim was improper.
E. The District Court Erred In Summanlv Dismissing the Claim of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Based Uuon the Failure of Counsel to Protect Mr. Kellv's
Constitutional Right Against Self-Incrimination at Sentencing.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 16-17, the District Court erred in summarily
dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure of counsel to
protect Mr. Kelly's constitutional right against self-incrimination at sentencing. Again, the State
has "adopt[ed] the district court's opinion on appeal" without offering any other argument in
support of its position. Respondent's Brief at p. 13.

As set out in the Opening Brief, the District Court erred when it dismissed the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to protect Mr. Kelly's right against selfincrimination at sentencing when it concluded that the claim should be dismissed because "Kelly
,
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does not provide any evidence that he attempted to invoke this right." CR 78. The District
Court's conclusioil is contrary to Estvada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,564 149 P.3d 833, 839 (2006),
which holds that counsel's failure to advise the client that helshe has a Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to submit to a psychosexual evaluation can constitute ineffective assistance and State v.

Person, 145 Idaho 293,298, 178 P.3d 658,663 (2007), holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies both at sentencing and in presentence evaluations.
The State has offered nothing to rebut this argument.
The District Court erred in its conclusion that Mr. Kelly was required to present proof of
his assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights in the presentence proceedings in order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel in not protecting those rights. And, the State has presented
nothing to the contrary. Therefore, Mr. Kelly asks for this reason also that the order dismissing
his petition be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
F. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissing the Claim of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Based Upon Counsel's Failure to File a Supwression
Motion.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 17-18, the District Court erred in summarily
dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure of counsel to file
a suppression motion. Here again, the State has "adopt[ed] the district court's opinion on
appeal" without offering any other argument in support of its position. Respondent's Brief at p.
13.

The District Court's dismissal of this issue was premised upon its finding that Mr. Kelly
had failed to prove that he had requested that counsel file a suppression motion. CR 80-81
I-Iowever, the standard for establishing ineffective assistance-ofcounselis demonstration.of -.
.
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performance below an objective standard of reasonableness which results in prejudice.
Stvickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), Hussett v. State, 127

Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 1995). A defendant is not required to demonstrate
that he asked counsel not to make the errors that led to falling below an objective standard of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. So, for example, in this case, Mr. Kelly was not required to
prove that he asked counsel to file a suppression motion in order to prevail upon a claim that
counsel was ineffective in not filing sic11 a motion. Indeed, the State has not attempted to offer
any argument that a criminal defendant must request a suppression motion before counsel can be
found ineffective for failing to file one. The question of whether Mr. Kelly asked counsel to file
a motion is, in fact, irrelevant to the question of whether counsel rendered deficient performance.
The District Court erred in suinmarily dismissing Mr. Kelly's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because Mr. Kelly did not offer proof that he had asked counsel to file a
suppression motion. And, the State has offered no argument to the contrary. For this reason
also, Mr. Kelly asks that the order dismissing his petition be reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings.

G. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissing the Claim that Mr. Kelly
was Denied his Constitutional Rights Against Self-Lncrimination.
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 18-19, the District Court erred in summarily
dismissing Mr. Kelly's claims based upon the denial of his constitutional rights against self-
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incriminalion. Yet again, the State has "adopt[ed] the district court's opinion on appeal" without
offering any other argument in support of its position. Respondent's Brief at p. 13.
.

.

. The District Coui-t summarily dismissed these claims stating, "However, Kelly gave u p
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e chose to plead guilty." CR 83. However, per Estrada, supra, and Person,
supra, the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in sentencing proceedings.
(Note, both Estrada and Person were cases in which the defendant had pled guilty.)
The District Court erred in its conclusion that the guilty plea waived the right against selfincrimination in the sentencing proceedings. Id. Further, the State has offered no argument to
the contrary and has not attempted to explain how the District Court's reasoning can be
reconciled with Estrada and Person. For these reasons also, Mr. Kelly asks that the order
dismissing his petition be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
111. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in his Opening Brief and above, Mr. Kelly asks that the order
dismissing his petition be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted this >?ay

of October. 2008
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Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Gregory Kelly
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